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The growing interest in individual differences in decisionmaking has been accompanied by a grow-
ing interest in developmental differences. A developmental perspective has the power to elucidate
the role that brain development and experience play in decision making. However, it also has the
potential to mislead. In contrast to adult participants, who one assumes are similar in their under-
standing of an experimental paradigm, children of different ages may view a paradigm through very
different lenses. Of course, the point of a developmental perspective is to investigate how decision
making changes across development, but the findings are only valid in so far as each age group’s
understanding of the experimental paradigm is equivalent.
Gollin’s (1965) levels-by-levels approach addresses this issue by highlighting the value of manip-
ulating the “organismic dimension” (level 1) and “task dimension” (level 2) concurrently. While it
is commonplace for developmental psychologists to manipulate the organismic dimension (i.e., the
age of participants), the task dimension is often overlooked. This manipulation comes in one of two
forms: Gollin’s (1965) approach of systematically increasing task complexity and Bitterman’s (1964)
approach of identifying and controlling for “contextual variables” (i.e., factors other than the one of
interest that adversely impact a subject’s performance). Comparative psychology perhaps holds the
clearest examples of these two approaches (Macphail, 1985). Gollin’s (1965) systematic approach is
exemplified by Lashley’s (1929) investigation of the impact of brain lesions onmaze learning in rats.
Lashley (1929) systematically varied both the size of the lesion (i.e., the organismic dimension) and
the complexity of the maze (i.e., the task dimension). The lesions had little impact on simple mazes,
suggesting that basic learning was not impaired, but as the complexity of the mazes increased, the
lesions had greater and greater impact and this impact was mediated by the size of the lesion.
Themostmarked example of Bitterman’s (1964) approach derives fromHarlow’s (1949) learning
set paradigm. The paradigm was designed to assess an animal’s ability to “learn how to learn” and
was initially thought to provide a way of ranking species by intelligence (e.g., Hodos, 1970; Jerison,
1973; Warren, 1974). In short, subjects are presented with a series of problems in which two stimuli
are presented; selecting one stimulus results in a reward while selecting the other stimulus results
in a punishment. Subjects are said to have developed a learning set once they start to select the
rewarded stimulus on the second trial of each new problem (i.e., Win Stay: If rewarded on Trial 1,
respond to the same stimulus on Trial 2; Lose Shift: If punished on Trial 1, respond to the other
stimulus on Trial 2). Initial studies employing the learning set paradigm found marked species
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differences. Specifically, most primate species rapidly acquired
a learning set, while rats continued to perform at chance after
several thousand trials (Hodos, 1970). Slotnick and Katz (1974),
however, demonstrated that rats trained with olfactory, rather
than visual stimuli, acquired a learning set at a similar speed
to chimpanzees. For rats, therefore, the visual modality of the
stimuli used in the initial experiments was a contextual variable.
Delay of Gratification
We recently applied the levels-by-levels approach to the delay-of-
gratification choice paradigm (Imuta et al., 2014). Mischel (1958)
developed the choice paradigm prior to developing the well-
known maintenance paradigm, colloquially referred to as the
Marshmallow Test (seeMischel, 2014, for an overview). Similar to
the maintenance paradigm, in the choice paradigm, participants
are faced with a small reward that they can receive immedi-
ately (i.e., “Now”) or a larger reward that they can receive after
a delay (i.e., “Later”). In contrast to the maintenance paradigm,
where children mustmaintain their decision to wait for the larger
reward, in the choice paradigm, children commit to either wait-
ing or not at the start of each trial. The dependent variable is the
proportion of trials on which children choose to wait. The gen-
eral finding is that 3-year-olds fail to delay gratification on the
choice paradigm, while 4-year-olds succeed (Thompson et al.,
1997; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Prencipe and Zelazo, 2005;
Lemmon and Moore, 2007).
Building on the extensive literature varying the task dimen-
sion of the maintenance paradigm (e.g., Mischel and Ebbe-
sen, 1970; Anderson, 1978; Karniol et al., 2011), Imuta et al.
(2014) manipulated the way in which the immediate and delayed
rewards were presented. Typically the immediate and delayed
rewards are presented in two groups that are physically separated
in space (e.g., Prencipe and Zelazo, 2005; Lemmon and Moore,
2007; Garon et al., 2011; see Figure 1A). When presented in
this manner, should children choose the “Now” option, they can
maintain their attention on the “Now” option (i.e., one sticker)
and largely ignore the removal the “Later” option (i.e., five stick-
ers). To circumvent this, Imuta et al. (2014) presented the stickers
in a single group (see Figure 1B). By presenting the task in this
manner, children can no longer ignore the quantity costs (i.e.,
four stickers) of selecting the “Now” option. Imuta et al. (2014)
demonstrated that 4-year-olds chose the “Later” option at a level
significantly above chance (i.e., 50%) on both the standard (75%)
and modified (82%) paradigms. The performance of 3-year-olds,
however, differed significantly between the two paradigms, rela-
tively infrequently choosing the “Later” option on the standard
paradigm (37%) but selecting it in the majority (76%) of trials on
the modified paradigm. By manipulating the age of participants
and the task (i.e., presentation format), we were able to demon-
strate that the presentation format was a contextual variable for
the younger, but not older, children.
Decision Making Under Risk
The development of decision making under risk is a rapidly
growing area of research wherein the levels-by-levels approach
FIGURE 1 | The presentation of the sticker rewards in the (A) standard
and (B) modified tasks.
has, and will continue to be, extremely valuable. For example,
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was initially developed to assess
patients with prefrontal lesions (Bechara et al., 1994), but is now
being used to study the development of affective decision mak-
ing (e.g., Crone and van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004;
Cauffman et al., 2010; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012). In the
standard IGT, participants are presented with four decks of cards,
each differing in their win:loss reward ratio. Participants are
asked to draw from the decks with the aim of maximizing their
reward. Two of the decks are “disadvantageous,” in that they give
high-value rewards but also high losses, leading to an overall loss
in the long term. The other two decks are “advantageous” decks,
which yield lower rewards but also lower losses, resulting in an
overall gain if participants consistently select cards from these
decks.
The majority of developmental studies that have used the
IGT have focused on simply charting changes in performance
across age, generally noting that children below the age of 12
fail to zero in on the advantageous decks (Crone and van der
Molen, 2004; Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; Overman et al., 2004;
Garon and Moore, 2007). Only recently have researchers begun
to investigate whether this age-related change is the result of
developmental differences in decision making, or attributable to
some contextual variable. For example, to investigate whether
limitations in working memory, rather than decision making,
can account for the developmental difference in IGT perfor-
mance, Van Duijvenvoorde et al. (2012) compared participants’
performance on an informed IGT, where the gains and losses
associated with each gambling machine (i.e., equivalent of a
deck) were explicitly presented on a computer screen, to that
on a standard non-informed IGT, where participants had to keep
track of the gains, losses, and probabilities associated with each
machine. Consistent with previous research, Van Duijvenvoorde
et al. (2012) found that children under the age of 12 failed
to make advantageous decisions in the non-informed IGT. In
contrast, children as young as 7 years of age made advanta-
geous decisions on the informed IGT. By taking the levels-by-
levels approach of manipulating both the age of participants and
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the task, Van Duijvenvoorde et al.’s (2012) study provides evi-
dence that children as young as 7 years are capable of engag-
ing in advantageous affective decision making, but also sheds
light on the specific cognitive limitation (i.e., memory) that
younger children face in this process. Future studies may look
to combine Van Duijvenvoorde et al.’s (2012) approach with
the play/pass version of the IGT, initially developed to investi-
gate individual differences in response to gains and losses (Peters
and Slovic, 2000; Cauffman et al., 2010), to provide a more
nuanced account of age-related changes in decision making on
the IGT.
Investigating the task dimension becomes even more impor-
tant as studies of decision making test younger and younger
children. Several groups have developed simplified decisionmak-
ing tasks with the aim of minimizing task difficulty for younger
participants (Paulsen et al., 2011, 2012; Weller et al., 2011). For
example, in the first study to assess economic decision making
in pre-school children, Steelandt et al. (2013) assessed the ratio-
nality of choices and judgment errors made by 3- to 9-year-old
children. Children were given an initial offering of a medium-
sized piece of cookie and then choose either to keep that offer or
risk it, by exchanging it for one of six cups that had more, less,
or the same amount of cookie, chosen at random. The amount of
cookie in each cup was manipulated such that on some trials, all
six cups held more cookies (i.e., a guaranteed gain), and on other
trials, the majority of the six cups held less.
Steelandt et al. (2013) found that 3- and 4-year-olds performed
poorly while 5- and 6-year-olds were able to correctly distin-
guish profitable situations from non-profitable situations. The
performance of the 3- to 4-year-olds may be due to economic
decision-making not being present at this age, or the complex-
ity of the paradigm. Indeed, the gamble option required children
to keep track of the reward across six separate cups, maintain that
information in memory, and use that information to estimate the
probability of winning or losing. A levels-by-levels approach, in
which the number of cups children must keep track of is manip-
ulated, along with children’s age, would allow one to disentangle
these two possibilities. Similar to Lashley’s (1929) rats, it may
be that developmental differences in decision making under risk
are closely tied to task complexity, such that developmental dif-
ferences only emerge when the task reaches a certain level of
complexity.
Conclusion
As illustrated in the examples provided above, the key to gaining
a developmental perspective of decision making hinges on pay-
ing careful attention to the interaction between the participant
dimension and the task dimension. This has particular relevance
for the study of individual differences, given it has the potential
to inform whether the individual differences observed are a result
of individual differences in decision making or individual differ-
ences with respect to task understanding.While the use of a single
standardized task that can be used across ages and individuals is
appealing, as the studies outlined above suggest, by putting all
your eggs in one basket you may miss the nuances in the data
that Gollin’s (1965) levels-by-levels approach can provide.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Professor Michael Colombo and Pro-
fessor Ted Ruffman for comments on earlier drafts of the
manuscript.
References
Anderson, W. H. (1978). A comparison of self-distraction with self-verbalization
under moralistic versus instrumental rationales in a delay-of-gratification
paradigm. Cognit. Ther. Res. 2, 299–303. doi: 10.1007/BF01185793
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., and Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensi-
tivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortext.
Cognition 50, 7–15. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3
Bitterman, M. E. (1964). The evolution of intelligence. Sci. Am. 212, 92–100. doi:
10.1038/scientificamerican0165-92
Cauffman, E., Shulman, E. P., Steinberg, L., Claus, E., Banich, M. T., Graham,
S., et al. (2010). Age differences in affective decision making as indexed by
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task. Dev. Psychol. 46, 193–207. doi:
10.1037/a0016128
Crone, E. A., and van der Molen, M. W. (2004). Developmental changes in real life
decision making: performance on a gambling task previously shown to depend
on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Dev. Neuropsychol. 25, 251–279. doi:
10.1207/s15326942dn2503_2
Garon, N., and Moore, C. (2007). Awareness and symbol use improves future-
oriented decision making in pre-schoolers. Dev. Neuropsychol. 31, 39–59. doi:
10.1207/s15326942dn3101_3
Garon, N., Johnson, B., and Steeves, A. (2011). Sharing with others and
delaying for the future in preschoolers. Cogn. Dev. 26, 383–396. doi:
10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.09.007
Gollin, E. S. (1965). A developmental approach to learning and cognition. Adv.
Child Dev. Behav. 2, 159–186. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2407(08)60482-6
Harlow, H. F. (1949). The formation of learning sets. Psychol. Rev. 56, 51–65. doi:
10.1037/h0062474
Hodos, W. (1970). “Evolutionary interpretation of neural and behavioral studies
in living vertebrates,” in The Neurosciences: Second Study Program, ed F. O.
Schmidt (New York, NY: Rockefeller University Press), 26–39.
Hongwanishkul, D., Happaney, K. R., Lee, W. S., and Zelazo, P. D. (2005).
Assessment of hot and cool executive function in young children: age-related
changes and individual differences. Dev. Neuropsychol. 28, 617–644. doi:
10.1207/s15326942dn2802_4
Hooper, C. J., Luciana, M., Conklin, H. M., and Yarger, R. S. (2004).
Adolescents’ performance on the Iowa Gambling Task: implications
for the development of decision making and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex. Dev. Psychol. 40, 1148–1158. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.
6.1148
Imuta, K., Hayne, H., and Scarf, D. (2014). I want it all and I want it now: delay
of gratification in preschool children. Dev. Psychobiol. 56, 1541–1552. doi:
10.1002/dev.21249
Jerison, H. J. (1973). Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence. New York, NY:
Academic Press.
Karniol, R., Galili, L., Shtilerman, D., Naim, R., Stern, K., Manjoch, H., et al.
(2011). Why Superman can wait: cognitive self-transformation in the delay
of gratification paradigm. J. Clin. Child Adolesc. Psychol. 40, 307–317. doi:
10.1080/15374416.2011.546040
Kerr, A., and Zelazo, P. D. (2004). Development of “hot” executive function:
the children’s gambling task. Brain Cogn. 55, 148–157. doi: 10.1016/S0278-
2626(03)00275-6
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 541
Imuta et al. Gollin’s (1965) levels-by-levels approach
Lashley, K. S. (1929). Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence: A Quantitative Study
of Injuries to the Brain. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. doi: 10.1037/
10017-000
Lemmon, K., and Moore, C. (2007). The development of prudence in the
face of varying future rewards. Dev. Sci. 10, 502–511. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2007.00603.x
Macphail, E. (1985). Vertebrate intelligence: the null hypothesis. Philos. Trans. R.
Soc. B Biol. Sci. 308, 37–51. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1985.0008
Mischel, W. (1958). Preference for delayed reinforcement: an experimental
study of a cultural observations. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 56, 57–61. doi:
10.1037/h0041895
Mischel, W. (2014). The Marshmallow Test: Mastering Self-control. New York, NY:
Hachette Book Group, Inc.
Mischel, W., and Ebbesen, E. B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 16, 329–337. doi: 10.1037/h0029815
Overman, W. H., Frassrand, K., Ansel, S., Trawalter, S., Bies, B., and Redmond,
A. (2004). Performance on the Iowa card task by adolescents and adults.
Neuropsychologia 42, 1838–1851. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.03.014
Paulsen, D. J., Carter, R. M., Platt, M. L., Huettel, S. A., and Brannon, E. M.
(2011). Neurocognitive development of risk aversion from early childhood to
adulthood. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:178. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00178
Paulsen, D. J., Platt, M. L., Huettel, S. A., and Brannon, E. M. (2012). From
risk-seeking to risk-averse: the development of economic risk preference from
childhood to adulthood. Front. Psychol. 3:313. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00313
Peters, E., and Slovic, P. (2000). The springs of action: affective and analytical
information processing in choice. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 26, 1465–1475. doi:
10.1177/01461672002612002
Prencipe, A., and Zelazo, P. D. (2005). Development of affective decision mak-
ing for self and other: evidence for the integration of first- and third-person
perspectives. Psychol. Sci. 16, 501–505. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01564.x
Slotnick, B. M., and Katz, H. M. (1974). Olfactory learning-set formation in rats.
Science 30, 796–798. doi: 10.1126/science.185.4153.796
Steelandt, S., Broihanne, M.-H., Romain, A., Thierry, B., and Dufour, V. (2013).
Decision-making under risk of loss in children. PLoS ONE 8:e52316. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0052316
Thompson, C., Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1997). The development of future-
oriented prudence and altruism in preschoolers. Early Child Res. Q. 12,
199–212. doi: 10.1016/S0885-2014(97)90013-7
Van Duijvenvoorde, A. C. K., Jansen, B. R. J., Bredman, J. C., and Huizenga,
H. M. (2012). Age-related changes in decision making: comparing informed
and noninformed situations. Dev. Psychol. 48, 192–203. doi: 10.1037/a00
25601
Warren, J. M. (1974). Possibly unique characteristics of learning by
primates. J. Hum. Evol. 3, 445–454. doi: 10.1016/0047-2484(74)90
004-9
Weller, J. A., Levin, I. P., and Denburg, N. L. (2011). Trajectory of risky decision
making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85. J. Behav. Decis. Mak.
24, 331–344. doi: 10.1002/bdm.690
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Imuta, Hewitt and Scarf. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 541
